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Abstract:   There has been little discussion of the compatibility of Theistic Conceptual Realism 
(TCR) with the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS).  On one hand, if a plurality of universals is 
necessary to explain the character of particular things, there is reason to think this commits the 
proponent of TCR to the existence of a plurality of divine concepts.  So the proponent of the 
DDS has a prima facie reason to reject TCR (and vice versa).  On the other hand, many 
mediaeval philosophers accept both the existence of divine ideas and the DDS.  In this paper I 
draw on Mediaeval and contemporary accounts of properties and divine simplicity to argue that 
the two theories are not logically incompatible.  
According to Theistic Conceptual Realism (TCR), divine concepts, conceived of as eternal 
aspects of the divine mind, do the metaphysical lifting for which abstract universals are posited 
on platonic realist accounts of abstract objects.  This involves (partially) grounding the 
phenomena associated with the ‘problem of universals,' such as property exemplification, 
attribute agreement, subject-predicate discourse, and abstract reference.  Along with its cousin, 
Theistic Activism, this view of universals has garnered significant interest in recent years among 
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theist metaphysicians who wish to reconcile their commitment to the existence of abstract 
objects with traditional theist doctrines such as aseity and sovereignty.   However, there has been 1
little discussion of its compatibility with another traditional, albeit controversial, doctrine: divine 
simplicity (Gehring (2014)).  The DDS entails that God is completely free of ontological 
structure and complexity—in God there is no distinction between form and matter, substance and 
property, thinker and thought.  On one hand, if a plurality of universals is necessary to explain 
the character of particular things, there is reason to think that TCR commits one to the existence 
of a plurality of divine concepts—a plurality which would be incompatible with the DDS.  So the 
proponent of the DDS has a prima facie reason to reject TCR (and vice versa).   On the other 2
hand, many mediaeval philosophers from whom contemporary proponents of TCR draw 
inspiration—most notably St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas—accept both the existence of 
multiple divine ideas and the DDS.  This may give us reason to consider more carefully whether 
the two theories can be reconciled.  In this paper, I assume for the sake of argument that the 
problem of universals is primarily a question about the character of particulars, which requires a 
theory of properties as its solution (See Armstrong (1989); Loux (2007); Gould (2011)).   That is, 
I understand the problem as one requiring an explanation of what grounds the fact that A is x—
the fact that A has the particular characteristic that x confers.  Furthermore, I will address only 
the particular tensions and possibilities that arise from the conjunction of the DDS with TCR 
about universals, leaving others to debate both whether the DDS is independently coherent and 
whether it is compatible with TCR about other kinds of abstracta. 
 As I see it, any attempt to reconcile TCR with the DDS will face two obstacles.  The first 
is perhaps the most notorious difficulty facing proponents of the DDS: how to account for the 
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truth of divine predication. As we will see below,  the most popular versions of TCR assume that 
properties, either abstract or particularized, explain the character of concrete particulars.  The 
DDS requires denying that God exemplifies multiple properties.  Thus, the successful argument 
for the compatibility of TCR and the DDS will require an explanation of how a simple God can, 
without exemplifying any properties, possess the sort of “rich” character that traditional theology 
attributes to God.  Here I believe that the particular version of TCR that I defend suggests 
possibilities that have yet to be considered in this debate. Second, as mentioned above, because 
TCR equates property-universals, which are apparently myriad, with divine concepts, there is a 
problem of explaining how a simple being can have a multiplicity of concepts.  In what follows I 
first provide a brief overview of a plausible version of TCR, I then address these two issues in 
turn.  In so doing, I demonstrate that it is possible for a theist with platonic leanings to reconcile 
her realism about universals, not only with the strong aseity-sovereignty doctrine, but also with 
the DDS. 
An Introduction to Theistic Conceptual Realism 
One way to motivate the idea that divine concepts can ground the character of particular things is 
to demonstrate that the conjunction of the doctrines of divine omniscience and creation ex nihilo 
naturally lends itself to a relationship between God, divine concepts, and particular created 
things that is sufficient to ground the phenomena typically associated with the problem of 
universals. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo says that God creates out of nothing everything 
distinct from Godself.   The doctrine of omniscience—which claims, roughly, that God knows 3
everything that can be known  —provides prima facie evidence for the belief that, logically prior 4
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to the act of creation, God both knows and intends to create whatever God in fact creates.  It 5
would be surprising if it turned out that God knows what God creates only because God creates 
it, rather than creating it because that is what God intends (logically prior to creation) (see Ross 
(1986), for a defense of this surprising view).  Even without a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for divine knowledge, it is not a stretch to think that if some knowledge can properly 
be said to be God’s knowledge, then something or other in God must bear an appropriate relation 
to whatever the act of creation brings into existence.  I will take some anthropomorphic leeway 
and call that something in God a concept.  We need not say that this concept is chronologically 
prior to God’s creative act, but the concept must be both logically and causally prior to God’s act 
of creation if it is to be true that God knows what God creates rather than creating ignorantly.    6
From the doctrines of creation and omniscience we can infer something of the 
relationship that holds between the divine being and the particulars that God creates.  On one 
hand, God’s creation entails that particulars derive their being from God.  This is a causal 
dependence.  On the other hand, God’s knowledge and intentions entail some sort of 
correspondence between the divine concept and the particular that God creates.  The particular 
must resemble, be like, or imitate the divine concept in accordance with which God intends to 
create.  We expect God’s will to successfully bring into being exactly that thing which God 
intends to create, and that this thing is like the concept in accordance with which God creates it.  
We might think of these divine concepts as the extrinsic, formal causes of particulars in the 
world.  Particulars come into being as a result of the act of creation, but they are the kind of thing 
that they are because of the relation in which they stand to divine concepts.  That is, particulars 
have their properties in virtue of the relation in which they stand to the divine concepts.  
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Therefore, the relation of a particular to its extrinsic formal cause is a sort of ontological 
dependence.  It seems reasonable to think that if it is part of the essence of some thing, x, that it 
is what it is because of its relationship to y, and not vice versa, then x ontologically depends on y.  
For example, E. J. Lowe defines two kinds of ontological dependence, one weaker and one 
stronger as follows ((2003), 194): 
(ND1) x is rigidly existentially necessarily dependent on y ↔ df. Nec (x exists only if y 
exists). 
(ED1) x is rigidly existentially essentially dependent on y ↔ df. Ex (x exists only if y 
exists).   7
If we take a particular person, x, the doctrine of creation entails that, necessarily, x only exists if 
God does.  Furthermore, the doctrine of omniscience entails that it is part of the essence of a 
particular human that they exist only if God’s concept of humanity exists.  The same could be 
said about any particular created thing and its properties.  Within Lowe’s framework, then, we 
can say that particulars rigidly, existentially, necessarily depend on God (ND1)  and that they 8
rigidly existentially essentially depend on divine concepts (ED1).  Because essential dependence 
entails necessary dependence, it follows that particulars ND1-depend on the divine concepts as 
well.  If ED1 is transitive,  and divine concepts are dependent on God in the same way, as 9
plausibly they are,  then it follows that particulars are also ED1-dependent on God.  It is 10
important to note here that this is not intended to endorse Lowe’s particular way of cashing out 
ontological dependence.  Rather, the point is that for any notion of ontological dependence that 
one formulates, it should turn out that created particulars ontologically depend on their respective 
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divine concepts, because, according to TCR, the creation relation entails both causal and 
ontological dependence.  
 I indicated in the introduction that I follow D. M. Armstrong, Michael Loux, and others 
in taking the problem of universals to be a problem of explaining the the character of particulars
—of explaining what grounds them being the kind of thing that they are and the properties that 
they have.   As such, it requires a theory of properties as its solution. With a theory of properties 11
in place, one is then situated to explain all of the phenomena typically associated with the 
problem of universals: the truth of subject predicate discourse, abstract reference, and property 
agreement.  I have argued elsewhere (Panchuk (2016)) and briefly summarized here how divine 
concepts can do that metaphysical work for which traditional Platonists posit abstract property 
universals.  If I want to know why the dog is brown, one sort of explanation that can be given is 
because the dog exemplifies the property being brown.  We can call this the ontological ground 
of character.  But what it means for the dog to exemplify the property being brown, according to 12
my formulation of TCR, is that it bears a resemblance relation to the divine concept, being 
brown. 
The Simplicity of Divine Character 
If one accepts that divine concepts do the work of explaining the character of particulars and that 
they ground the truth of subject predicate discourse, then if multiple predicates can be applied to 
a single particular, it seems that this particular must bear a resemblance relations to multiple 
divine concepts and, therefore, exemplify multiple properties.  What then are we to say about 
God?  The fact that we speak of God using a variety of distinct predicates provides at least a 
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prima facie reason to think that God has some sort of positive, complex character.  According to 
classical theism, God is omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, etc.  If this sort of predication 
is appropriate, then we have some (but not conclusive) reason to think that God exemplifies 
various properties.  Indeed, this is the conclusion that Alvin Plantinga draws (1980).  He argues 
that God must exemplify properties because, according to the law of the excluded middle, for 
any predicable, we must predicate either it, or its negation, of God.  Either God exemplifies the 
property being holy, or God exemplifies the property not being holy.  He exemplifies the 13
property being cruel, or he exemplifies the property not being cruel. Thus, claims Plantinga, 
property exemplification is unavoidable.  But if we follow Platinga in accepting that the principle 
of character grounding applies to God, serious difficulties loom for the DDS. For, as Plantinga 
points out, if both what I am calling the principle of character grounding and the DDS are true, 
then God is identical to a property.  The DDS entails that God is identical to the divine essence 
and that God has no properties apart from that essence.  Therefore, God is identical to divine 
love, and to divine power, and to divine knowledge.  But, if God is identical to God’s love, and 
God’s love just is the property being loving, then God is identical to a property.  Because 
Plantinga thinks that properties are abstract objects, he concludes that the DDS entails that God 
is an abstract object: ‘But no abstract object could have created the world,’ because abstract 
objects are causally inert (ibid., 47).  So it seems that we must reject the DDS altogether. 
 One possible solution to this worry is to accept that God is identical to a property, but 
deny that this claim is problematic.  William Mann has taken this approach, arguing that all 
people are identical to a special kind of particularized property instance he calls a rich property, 
consisting of all of the time-indexed property instances that they ever exemplify (Mann (1982), 
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466ff; see Morris (1985) for a response).  If this is right, God can be both identical to a property 
and the personal creator of the universe.  It is doubtful, however, that such a response is open to 
the Theistic Conceptual Realist, because it is likely to result in a vicious form of bootstrapping, 
as others have argued in detail elsewhere (See Bergmann and Brower (2006); Gould (2011); 
Panchuk (2016); Gould and Davis (2017)).  The brief explanation of that argument is that if God 
exemplifies properties within the TCR framework, God’s nature ends up being both causally 
prior and causally posterior to God’s own nature, because properties are identical to divine 
concepts. 
Michael Bergmann and Jeffery Brower endorse an approach that is more promising for 
proponents of TCR (although they themselves reject platonic theories such as TCR and Theistic 
Activism).  They deny that one should accounted for divine predication in terms of 
exemplifiables, and instead adopt a combination of substance ontology and a truthmaker theory 
of predication.  In so doing, they deny that the truth of our discourse about God’s character 
requires that God exemplify properties.  According to their account of truthmaker theory, ‘If an 
entity E is a truthmaker for a predication P, then ‘E exists’ entails the truth expressed by 
P’ ((2006), 376).   
There are theoretical reasons, which they acknowledge, for taking this only as a partial 
analysis, but the general suggestion should be clear.  For every essential predication (predications 
of properties essential to a thing’s nature) of God, P, God’s existence necessitates the truth of P, 
because P is true in every possible world where God exists.  The simple divine substance is the 
obvious candidate for being the truthmaker for all divine predications.  If that is right, the divine 
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substance is the truthmaker for the proposition ‘God is love,’ and for the proposition ‘God is 
omniscient.’ We need not appeal to properties at all.  
 There is something right about this approach.  First, it seems that the DDS fits more 
naturally within the sort of substance ontology that was standard in the mediaeval world, but I 
will not argue for that view here.  Second, Bergmann and Brower are right to reject 
exemplifiables as the only candidates for explaining the truth of our discourse about God.  Other 
theories of the truth of subject-predicate discourse are available, including truthmaker theory.  
However, it is critical to remember that the apparent tension between the DDS and TCR arose 
not primarily from issues related to truth, but out of considerations of ontological structure 
(Leftow (2015)).  As I have formulated it, TCR is not primarily a thesis about predication 
(though it has important implications for predication); it is a theory about what metaphysically 
grounds a specific phenomenon.  The phenomenon under present consideration is that particulars 
apparently possess distinct and complex characters.  We might wonder what makes the 
proposition ‘Socrates is human’ true, but we can also ignore this question and wonder what 
grounds the fact that Socrates is human.  In what does the state of affairs of Socrates being 
human consist?  Depending on one’s ontological commitments, the answers will vary: Socrates 
being an instance of the kind-universal humanity; Socrates being constituted by a bundle of 
tropes that necessarily has his humanitys trope as a constituent; or Socrates’ participating in the 
divine concept of humanity.  The same is true in the case of God.  One might grant that the 
divine substance is the truthmaker for all essential divine predications while still wondering how 
it can be that a simple being like God has an, apparently, rich character.  What explains the fact 
that a single, ontologically simple substance can be the truthmaker for diverse predications? This 
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question is not necessarily answered by any particular theory of predication.  Thus, if we wish to 
embrace the spirit of Bergman and Brower’s intuitions, and deny that God exemplifies a 
multiplicity of properties, we must still say something about what explains the fact that the 
divine character apparently has characteristics which created particulars could only possess by 
being ontologically complex.  I will suggest that the distinction between the created and the 
uncreated, the finite and the infinite, can explain why the character of finite beings must be 
grounded in the properties they exemplify while the character of an infinite being need not be.  
 I propose that two things are true of property exemplification according to TCR: (1) 
property exemplifications arises from the creation relation, and (2) property exemplification 
entails finitude.  Each gives us reason to deny that God exemplifies properties.  The first claim 
follows straightforwardly from our discussion in the first section.  I have argued that particulars 
ontologically depend on divine concepts because they are the result of God’s intentions to create 
in accordance with those concepts.  But, God does not depend in any way on the intentions of 
another.   
 To understand the justification for (2), it is helpful to think about what follows from the 
fact that any particular exemplifies a property.  To exemplify a property is to exist in a certain 
way (Armstrong (1989), 96-97).  It is to exist in this way, rather than in that way.  In other 
words, to exemplify a property is to be delimited and finite.  For this wine to be red, it must not 14
be (in the same way and at the same time) any of the other colours of the rainbow.  To be a dog is 
to fail to be a cat and all of the other animals at the zoo.  Furthermore, being an instance of a 
kind-universal or exemplifying one property may limit the range of other properties that a 
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particular can exemplify.  Being an instance of the universal-kind dog means that the particular 
cannot exemplify the property being prime.   Properties impose a specific set of limits on 15
particulars.  If we are right to think that property exemplification follows from the act of 
creation, then being finite (on at least some axis or another) would follow necessarily from being 
created.   Only created particulars depend for their existence on the intentions of another, and 16
only created particulars are finite expressions of being.  
 If properties explain the limits on the being of particulars, and God is absolutely infinite, 
then it follows that God does not exemplify any properties.  However, we do not want to be 
forced to say that because God is property-less that God is also character-less.  I suggest that if 
properties are delimited ways of being, an infinite being, far from having a more impoverished 
character than finite things, has a richer one—an infinitely richer one.  The infinite encompasses 
all that finite beings are, because, not having these limitations on being, it is more than them, 
without being (exactly) any particular thing that they are.  It is hard to conceptualize this along 
all axes simultaneously, but if we use a comparison with properties along one axis it may be 
helpful.  A line that is infinitely long lacks the properties ‘being (exactly) one inch long’ and 
‘being (exactly) two inches long’ not because it lacks these inches of length but because its 
infinite length encompasses and surpasses them both without possessing either particular length.  
I claim that something similar is true when comparing God to finite things, only it holds along all 
possible axes.  The divine being is simple, but infinite, and thus ‘rich.’ 
 There is precedent for this claim in the history of philosophy, stretching back through the 
neo-platonists at least back to Plotinus and perhaps even to Parmenides.  But given our present 
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concern with the relationship between God and universals, Nicolas of Cusa’s discussion of the 
nature of God as infinite universal is particularly suggestive.  Cusanus is committed to the via 
negativa.  He argues that we cannot properly or truthfully speak of what or who God is; we may 
only affirm what God is not.  Foremost among those properties that God does not exemplify is 
finitude.  Cusanus thinks that from the fact that God is not finite we can infer that God is the 
‘absolute universal.’  On this view, universals exist as distinct universals only in particular things, 
but they exist in God as identical to God.  To explain how it is possible for ‘all possible things’ to 
be in God actually, while still be identical to God, Cusanus turns to the mathematics of infinity 
for a metaphor that he claims transcends our power of imagination, but is ‘graspable by the 
intellect’ (On Learned Ignorance I, 14: 37).  He reasons that an infinite circle is a circle, the 
diameter of which is infinitely long.  Because any given arc of a circle is more or less curved in 
proportion to the circle’s diameter, an infinite diameter requires a minimally curved line that is 
infinitely long—i.e., an infinite, straight line (ibid., I, 13: 36).  Thus, an infinite line and an 
infinite circle are one and the same.  Cusanus expresses this relationship by saying that the 
infinite circle is “enfolded” in the infinite line.  The example is meant to prove that at the infinite 
limit, things lose their differentiation (ibid., I, 16: 42).  Thus, something infinite simpliciter 
(rather than only in length, or only in size, or only in goodness) would lack any particular 
qualities while encompassing all of them.  This is why Cusanus says that  God 'is the Absolute 
Form of all formable forms. He enfolds in Himself the forms of all things’ (ibid., I, 3: 9).  Even if 
Cusanus’s understanding of geometry and infinity leaves something to be desired by 
contemporary standards, I believe he has metaphorically communicated something about the 
nature of God that may not be expressible via literal discourse.  Perhaps we grasp something in 
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his metaphors that, while not literally true about lines and circles, gets us closer to understanding 
the relationship between the infinite divine nature and finite created particulars. What we are 
supposed to grasp, along with the rest of the neo-platonic tradition, is that the infinite surpasses 
the finite by encompassing it.  God is wholly other, while being more, not less, than any created 
particular. 
Given the foregoing discussion of the ontological character of the divine substance, we 
are now in a position to ask questions about discourse concerning God.  While giving a thorough 
account of predication is not within the scope of this paper, I think at least two accounts are 
compatible with the picture I have presented.  If one is inclined to truthmaker theory, then the 
infinite substance can be the truthmaker for all essential predications of God as Bergmann and 
Brower suggest, only now we have some explanation of how and why it is the truthmaker for 
diverse predications, despite being simple.  If we accept this view, some questions will still 
remain.  For one, if God encompasses everything, why are some predications true of God while 
others are false?  I will return to this question in a moment.  But on my account, unlike 
Bergmann and Brower’s, if one rejects truthmaking one may still be able to give a satisfactory 
explanation of divine predication.  If properties always indicate limits on being, one might draw 
on the venerable tradition of the via negativa and argue that divine predications refer not to the 
properties that God exemplifies—since God exemplifies none—but to the absence in God of 
various limits that are present in created particulars.  That is, when we say that God is 
omniscient, we claim that God is not limited with respect to knowledge.  When we say that God 
is omnipotent, we claim that God is not limited with respect to power.  There are two ways that 
one might interpret these claims.   On the first, God is not limited with respect to power because 17
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God does not possess power at all.  To possess power would be to possess a limit.  Few theists, 
would be satisfied with such radically revisionary entailments.  On the second, God is not limited 
with respect to power, not because God lacks power, because God surpasses the limits that the 
property ‘having power’ indicates in finite creatures, having infinitely more.  When I say God is 
not limited with respect to power or to knowledge, I mean ‘God does not lack (any amount of) 
power’ and ‘God does not lack (any amount of) knowledge’.  In other words, God does not lack 
what a finite being possesses when they exemplify the property ‘being powerful,’ (when they 
instantiate limits with respect to this mode of being) in the same way that the infinite line does 
not lack what the the inch-long line segment has when it exemplifies the property ‘being 
(exactly) one inch long.’  It is just that at the infinite limit, power is not distinct from knowledge, 
is not distinct from God.  This acknowledges the intuitions behind negative theology and perhaps 
Thomistic analogical truth (a theory beyond the scope of this paper) while affirming as true the 
positive claims that many theists believe to be essential to theology.  
  However, one might think that the “with respect to” locutions used above reveal a subtle 
(or perhaps not-so-subtle) acknowledgement of divine complexity in my theory.  The absence of 
limits with respect to this, rather than that, might suggest that one can distinguish various aspects 
of the divine, which might be limited, but are not.  The divine has knowledge, which might be 
limited, but isn’t, and power that might be limited, but isn’t.  This would be the wrong 
interpretation of these locutions.  In the context of the picture I have proposed, the phrase “with 
respect to” refers not to a distinction between aspects of the divine nature, but to the complexity 
that a limit would constitute in the divine nature if it were there.   That is, once we conceptualize 18
a property, with it we grasp the specific kind of limit that property would constitute.  The limit 
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would be a limit with respect to something only because the limit itself would introduce 
complexity.  Being familiar with all of the ways in which finite creatures are limited, we can 
(relatively) easily conceptualize such limits that are absent within the divine nature.  Our subject-
predicate discourse, then, is the denial of these limits—and the properties that entail them—in 
God.    
 One might object to this proposal on the grounds that while the “omnis” fit neatly within 
it, other properties do not.  For example, it isn’t clear how ‘being the creator of Abraham,’ or 
‘being loving’ could be explained along these lines.  We cannot, after all, interpret ‘being the 
creator of Abraham’ as the absence of a limit on God’s creation, for there certainly are such 
limits, even if they are self-imposed.  God chose to create Abraham, kittens, and church mice 
rather than Frodo, centaurs, and house elves.  God does not create everything that God could 
possibly create, which seems to suggest the very limits that I deny above.   This does not pose a 19
particularly serious problem for someone who, like me, is partial to a sparse theory of properties, 
since such a person already assumes that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the 
predicates in natural language and the properties that things exemplify.  Predicates like ‘being the 
creator of Abraham’ refer to relational properties, which are extrinsic, rather than intrinsic.  It is 
the property being a creator or being capable of creating or, even better, being omnipotent that 
aptly characterizes God’s essence.  Having the capacity to create follows from the absence of a 
limit on divine power.  Similarly, ‘God is loving’ or ‘God is love’ means something like ‘In God 
there is no lack or limit to love.’  That is, there is an absence in God of the finite limits that make 
human love distorted and deficient.   20
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 Finally, if God encompasses all universals, we must explain why some predications 
express truths about God, while others do not.   Traditional theism says that God is loving, but 
that God is neither evil, nor ugly, nor four-legged.  With respect to the first two, I suggest holding 
to the Augustinian intuition that negative properties are privations.  If a property is a particular, 
limited way of being, a negative property refers to the absence of that particular way of being in 
that entity—one that is appropriate to its substance-kind.  So while the via negative suggest that 
God lacks limits by surpassing them, these privations are cases of lacking by deficiency or 
absence.  Something that is evil lacks goodness.  It fails to resemble the divine being in the 
delimited way that it should and is less like it.  With respect to the second, I mentioned above 
that exemplifying one property, or being an instance of a particular-kind, may circumscribe the 
other properties that the particular can simultaneously exemplify.  Being a dog precludes being a 
prime number.  Thus, a great number of properties will not make sense to predicate of God 
because those properties are dependent on the entity already existing in a particular, delimited 
way.    21
 In this section, I have explained a prima facie reason one might have for thinking that my 
Theistic Conceptual Realist account of properties conflicts with the DDS.  I then argued that 
some of the defenses of the DDS conflate accounts of truth with accounts of ontological 
character, and demonstrated that the later is fundamental.  I suggested that a simple but infinite 
being has the rich character we attribute to God because the infinite is more, not less, than 
particular finite things.  And finally, I argue that our discourse about God can either be accounted 
for via truthmaker theory or by a theory of reference to absences of limitations in the divine 
being.   
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The Simplicity of Divine Thought 
The second task in reconciling TCR and the DDS is to demonstrate that the latter is compatible 
with the claim that divine concepts ground all of the numerous properties that particulars do, or 
could, exemplify.  No doubt, the explanation of the relationship between the finite and the 
infinite in the previous sections suggests a promising starting point for such a demonstration, but 
as it stands it is insufficient.  As I pointed out in the introduction, on a straightforward 
interpretation TCR suggests that multiple, discrete concepts exist in God.  If my argument in the 
previous section is successful, we can think of God being simple while still having a “rich” 
character without accepting that God literately exemplifies properties, but it is difficult to see 
how God could entertain distinct concepts, that serve as extrinsic formal causes, without 
introducing complexity into the divine mind.  The doctrine of simplicity requires not only that 
there be no distinction between God and God’s properties, but that there be no distinction 
between God and God’s thoughts.  A promising account of a related issue—how God’s 
knowledge of contingent things, which differs across possible worlds, is compatible with 
simplicity—suggests that God’s knowledge of contingent things is extrinsic to God’s nature, 
such that there is no intrinsic difference in God across possible worlds (Pruss (2008); Matthews 
(2012)).  But the multiplicity of concepts for which I have argued is both necessary and intrinsic.  
They are necessary because God not only has concepts for those properties that God chooses to 
instantiate in created particulars, but also all those that God could instantiate in created 
particulars, whether or not God does so. Thus, they are constant across possible worlds.  They 
are intrinsic because God’s knowledge of creation, qua exemplar cause, is causally prior to the 
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act of creating and metaphysically prior to the instantiations of those properties; therefore, they 
are not the result of something external to God.    22
Thomas Aquinas addresses this issue in both the Summa Contra Gentiles (I, c. 51-2) and 
the Summa Theologiae (I.15.2).  In ST he argues that the divine ideas must be many, because 
God does not create one thing, which is causally responsible for the rest of the universe.  Rather 
God creates the order of the entire universe.  To have an idea of a whole requires that one have 
the ideas of all of the parts.  Therefore, God must have multiple ideas if God creates all of the 
parts of the universe.  Aquinas explains, however, that this is not at odds with the doctrine of 
simplicity because God does not have multiple images in God’s mind, which God forms on the 
basis of external things.  That is, the ideas in the mind of God are not intelligible species by 
which God knows particular things (as an intelligible species actualizing God’s intellect), but are 
that which is understood.  The ideas that serve as exemplar causes for finite particulars are 
identical to God’s divine self-knowledge.  God can know Godself in two ways—as God is in 
Godself and as God can be participated in by finite creatures.  Each species participates in the 
divine essence in its own unique way and measure. Thus, Thomas claims that the multiplicity is 
only from the perspective of the creation, while the principle or mode of knowledge is the simple 
divine nature, so knowledge of multiple things need not compromise God’s simplicity.  
Placed within the context of our earlier discussion, the ways in which finite particulars 
imitate God arise from the presence in them of boundaries or limits on being that are absent in 
the divine nature.  Any finite imitation of the infinite would have to be in some respect or 
another.  In knowing Godself, God knows not only the divine nature, but also the many ways in 
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which limited things can be like that nature.  So, while the object of divine knowledge is 
multiple, the mode by which God knows it—i.e. through the simple divine nature—is simple. Or 
at least so Thomas suggests (Doolan (2008), 83-122).  One might wonder if the inference is 
valid.  Even if the mode of knowledge is simple, what God knows in virtue of knowing that 
simple nature is decidedly complex.  In virtue of knowing Godself, God must also know that P1
—a is like God in x way—and P2—b is like God in y way—and so forth for every particular, 
every species, every genera, every property, and every relation.  If these propositions are distinct, 
then we have a prima facie reason to think that God’s concepts and thoughts are truly distinct in 
God.  The second problem, then, for reconciling TCR and the DDS arises from conceiving of 
God’s knowledge as propositional.  Propositional divine knowledge is problematic because God 
knows a multiplicity of proposition and, if propositions turn out to be complex, knowing each 
proposition itself involves further complexity.  The pressing question, then, is whether or not it is 
reasonable to deny that God’s knowledge is propositional.   
It should be obvious that non-propositional knowledge, in principle, exists.  Humans 
possess non-propositional knowledge in spades.  We know how to do things.  We know what 
things are like.  Consider Frank Jackson’s famous thought experiment of Mary in the black and 
white room (Jackson (1986)).  Prior to leaving her black and white existence, Mary is quite 
knowledgeable about the science of colour vision.  We can even imagine that she believes every 
true proposition relative to colour.  Nonetheless, when she leaves her room and experiences 
colour for the first time, it is reasonable to think that she gains knowledge.  She gains knowledge 
of what seeing colour is like, which was not captured by any of the propositions she previously 
knew to be true.  One might think (although it certainly isn’t uncontroversial) that knowledge of 
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what something is like is a distinct category of knowledge that is not reducible to its 
propositional cousins.  Perhaps God’s knowledge is more like our knowledge of what things are 
like than our knowledge that P. 
Unfortunately, the mere existence of non-propositional knowledge does not obviously 
help our case.  In order to defend the DDS, we need to demonstrate that it is possible that God 
non-propositionally knows the content of what we know when we know that P.  But one might 
think that knowledge of what something is like is fundamentally different from the kind of 
propositional knowledge that concerns us now.  Our use of the term ‘knowledge’ in both contexts 
may be merely polysemous.   We have propositional knowledge, and we have phenomenal 23
knowledge, and we have how-to knowledge, but we cannot know via one mode what we know 
via the other.  After all, I can know that This rose is red and I can know what experiencing this 
rose’s redness is like, but I can’t know that ‘This rose is red’ in a non-propositional way.  At 
least, so goes one popular view of perception and experience.  Many philosophers have argued 
that experience is fundamentally conceptual and propositional.  At the very least, it is 
controversial to think that we regularly experience anything without experiencing it as 
something.   
However, there is another strain of thought that places a brute givenness of experience at 
the foundation of empirical knowledge.  Consider again the experience of a red rose.  We might 
think the content of the experience fundamentally includes the concepts ‘rose’ and ‘redness’ and 
a certain phenomenal content—the what-it-is-like-ness of the experience—as distinct 
constituents (e.g., Brewer (2005); Byrne (2005)).  Both aspects, the conceptual and the 
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phenomenal, are equally fundamental on this picture.  Now consider a second picture.  When I 
experience the rose, I experience certain perceptual sensations that constitute the what-it-is-like-
ness of the experience.  Then, on the basis of that phenomenal content, I formulate concepts, and 
then entertain propositions, as a way of giving an account of my experience.  On this picture, the 
non-propositional experience is the raw, unified ‘data’ from which concepts are extracted.  Linda 
Zagzebski suggests a similar picture, claiming that:  
The problem [with reasons] is that the relation between my experience and a proposition I 
come to believe based on that experience is different in kind from the relation between 
one of my beliefs and another…The fact that I have a certain sensory experience of 
seeing yellow gives me a theoretical reason to believe there is something yellow there, 
but my grasp of the fact that I have the experience of seeing yellow must itself be 
justified by the experience of seeing yellow. The foundation of empirical knowledge is 
not a propositional belief, much less some neutral fact about the universe, but something 
of an entirely different kind, and the relation between an instance of that kind and a 
propositional belief differs qualitatively from the relation between one propositional 
belief and another. ((2011), 295) 
If she is right, every experience is non-propositional in a fundamental way.  But we don’t need 
anything quite this strong to make our point.  Even if it is doubtful that adult humans who 
already possess the relevant concepts can consciously experience the world in this brute, non-
conceptual way, we still have a coherent possible account of experience that places the non-
propositional at the foundations.  This makes it more plausible to think of God as having non-
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propositional knowledge that is more fundamental and more complete than ours.  Indeed, several 
philosophers have suggested a picture similar to Zagzebski’s for understanding divine 
knowledge.  Aquinas claims that God knows by a simple intuition all that can be known about a 
thing, rather than by ‘composing and dividing’ as humans do (SCG I. 38; ST I.14.16).  Thomas 
Sullivan similarly claims that God ‘attains intimate epistemic acquaintance' with all particulars 
by a single intellectual act that does not rely on 'impoverished abstraction.’ (Sullivan (1991), 30). 
And, William Alston suggests that F. H. Bradley’s account of experience that places at its base a 
state of ‘pure immediacy’ where there is no distinction between subject and object provides a 
helpful framework for thinking about divine cognition (Alston (1986), 290).  Human beings 
cannot grasp a concrete whole in its fullness.  Instead ‘we recognize certain abstract features…
which we proceed to formulate in distinct propositions’ (ibid., 291).  Furthermore, we need 
propositions in order to extended our knowledge by inference (ibid.).  God suffers from neither 
of these cognitive limitations, and therefore has no need to “divide” up divine knowledge into 
concept-sized bits.    
 Although it may be open to someone who endorses this mode of non-propositional, non-
conceptual knowing to follow the Thomistic view that God knows particulars through the divine 
essence (I will not here evaluate the success of this possibility), I think the proponent of TCR 
need not do so.  For the purposes of defending the compatibility of TCR with the DDS, it need 
only be the case that God knows properties (finite modes of being like the infinite being) by 
knowing the divine essence, because this knowledge must be causally and metaphysically prior 
to creation.  If God directly, non-propositionally, non-conceptually, and eternally intuits all that 
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is, there doesn’t seem to be any, in principle, reason to think that God cannot do so with the 
external world and the divine essence. 
However, the above perspective is not obviously compatible with Theistic Conceptual 
Realism as I have described it.  In the first section I referred to God’s concepts of created 
particulars.  The relation in which particulars stand to God’s concepts is the foundation of TCR.  
Here I claim that the sort of ‘composing and dividing’ that necessitates the existence of concepts 
is below the divine mode of knowing.  At this point it may be helpful to recall the purpose for 
which proponents of TCR appeal to divine concepts.  On TCR, divine concepts are supposed to 
do the work that abstract universals do in theories of platonic realism about property universals.  
That is, they metaphysically ground the properties that particulars exemplify, and in so doing 
explain the truth of subject-predicate discourse, abstract reference, and property agreement.  Can 
the divine mind mind fill these ontological and theoretical roles without containing distinct 
concepts?   
One obstacle to answering this question is that we, the metaphysicians, cannot entertain 
or answer the question without entertaining and appealing to distinct concepts. That is, we must 
reason about a mode of knowing to which we have no access. From our perspective, the divine 
mind will necessarily appear to “contain” distinction concepts, but this may say more about our 
mode of knowing that it does about God’s.  As such, any claim that I make will be necessarily 
tentative and suggestive, perhaps even more metaphorical than metaphysicians would prefer.  
But if the infinitely simple divine nature is necessarily richer than the finite particulars that 
participate in it, and if God can know in one simple act of direct intuition both the divine essence 
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and all to which the power of that divine essence extends, and if finite particulars can exist by 
being like God in finite delimited ways, such that they have their properties in virtue of that 
imitation, then it seems like the divine essence could perform the functions for which abstract 
universals are usually posited.  Particulars exemplify properties in virtue of the delimited 
resemblance relations they bear to the infinite and simple divine essence.  Multiple particulars 
exemplify the same property (attribute agreement) by bearing the same resemblance relations to 
the divine being.  Those very same “aspects” of the divine being ground the truth of subject 
predicate discourse.  And cases of abstract reference (at least in cases of fundamental 
abstractions) refer to those “aspects” of the divine mind. Returning to Aquinas’s and Cusanus’s 
arguments, particulars are like the aspects of the simple infinite nature that we can distinguish by 
imagining the limits that fail to exist in God.  God, on the other hand, need not distinguish these 
limits using discrete concepts as we do to know how the divine nature is imitable by finite 
particulars.  
 If anything in this ballpark is correct, we can say the following things about non-
propositional divine knowledge: (1) It is distinct from, but continuous with, the propositional 
knowledge that humans have; (2) It is richer than propositional knowledge; (3) It is more direct 
than propositional knowledge.  As odd as the idea of non-propositional knowledge of what 
humans can only know propositionally may initially sound, all three of these features—
difference, richness, and directness—are what a traditional theist should expect of divine 
knowledge.  Even if we cannot prove by any empirical mechanism that God in fact has such 
knowledge, we have at least shown that a theory that proposes such knowledge is not self-
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referentially incoherent, incomprehensible, or even completely discontinuous with some theories 
of human knowledge.   
Conclusion 
The doctrine of divine simplicity has a long and respectable pedigree.  It is part of classical 
theism, and it enjoyed widespread acceptance by the very thinkers who believed that divine ideas 
are causally and metaphysically linked to the nature of particulars.  I doubt that this alone is 
sufficient reason to accept the doctrine, but it does give us reason to doubt that it is obviously 
incoherent or clearly incompatible with the central theses of TCR.  In this paper I have argued 
that the finite-infinite distinction between creatures and the divine gives us reason to deny that 
the principle of character grounding applies to God.  I have shown that we can do so without 
sacrificing the rich character we attribute to the divine being. And finally, I have shown that non-
propositional knowledge is not obviously incompatible with the thesis that God knows the 
simple divine nature as imitable in diverse ways by finite particulars.   24
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 The aseity-sovereignty doctrine says that God does not depend on anything outside of God for God’s existence, 1
and that every other existing thing depends on God for its existence.
 Or, at least a “strong version” of divine simplicity, as Gehring (2014) argues. 2
 Whether abstract objects must, or even can, fall within the scope of the quantifier ‘everything’ is a matter of 3
significant debate.
 I do not attempt to define omniscience here, as most attempts to do so appeal to sets of propositions.  It will 4
become clear later in the paper why I am un-attracted to such formulations of the doctrine.
 The verb tenses in this sentence are a bit awkward, but I wish to avoid committing myself to God being in time.5
 Mediaeval authors repeatedly make this claim with respect to the divine ideas.  See, for example, (Augustine 6
(1981), 79-81), (Abelard (1994), 35), Thomas Aquinas, SCG I, c. 54; William of Ockham, Commentary of the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard. 
 Where Ex (P) means “it is essential to the nature of x that (P).” 7
 One problem with this sort of dependence is that it seems to make dependence on God trivially true, rather than 8
something that follows specifically from the doctrine of creation, since it will be trivially true that any particular 
thing will exist only if any necessary entity does.  So, it will be necessary that the red apple exists only if the number 
two does, if it turns out that the number two is a necessary entity.  This will be completely unproblematic if the 
Theistic Conceptual Realist can successfully explain all necessary entities with reference to the divine mind, because 
all such claims will come down to x’s existing only if God does, which seems right from the perspective of classical 
theism.
 It is widely assumed that metaphysical grounding relations are transitive. Jonathan Schaffer offers some putative 9
counter examples to the transitivity, but it is not clear to me that such cases can be generated for essential 
dependence. See, (Schaffer (2013)).
 It is essential to the nature of a divine concept that it exists only if God does.  It is essential to the nature of a 10
thought that it exists only if its thinker does. 
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 Although certainly not the only understanding of the problem of universals, it is currently the most popular.  See 11
further, (Loux (2007), 605).
 This points to a difficulty that Aristotelians about substance face.  On one hand it seems right to say that 12
universals or properties ground the character of particulars.  They explain them.  On the other hand, substance 
ontologists want properties to metaphysically depend on their substances, since the properties could not exist apart 
from them.  But metaphysical dependence seems like the sort of thing that should be asymmetric, or at least anti-
semetric.  Kathrin Koslicki, therefore, distinguishes between two kinds of metaphysical dependence: constitutive 
dependence and feature dependence (2012).  
 This claim makes clear that Plantinga has a rather robust theory of properties, according to which the negative of 13
a property is itself a property.  It also seems as though he might be suggesting that there are properties corresponding 
to every predicate in natural language.  I think there are reasons to reject both of these views in favour of a sparser 
theory, but since this will not solve the main problem that Plantinga raises, I won’t defend that sparser theory here. 
 It is important to distinguish between two different things that one might mean by this.  One might think that a 14
particular exemplifies the property that it does because it is delimited in a certain way.  That is, character determines 
properties.  That is not what I mean.  I mean to say here that properties explain, ground, or cause (in the sense of 
formal cause) the particular ways the thing is limited. This view can only get off the ground if one holds a sparse-ish 
theory of properties.  On this view, being infinite, cannot turn out to be a property.  But as I pointed out above in the 
discussion of Plantinga’s argument against the DDS, I see no reason to believe that there is a property corresponding 
to every predicate in natural language. 
 My thanks to Michael Dickson for pushing me to make this point explicit. 15
 This seems right; however, one might wonder if God could create another being that was identical to God in all 16
respects except for having been created.  It is my intuition that any being causally dependent on God would not 
rightly be considered infinite, but giving an argument for this view is outside of the scope of the present work.  My 
thanks to Chris Menzel for bringing this interesting puzzle to my attention.
 I thank an anonymous referee for encouraging me to clarify this point.17
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This is not simply a counterfactual, but a counter-possible.  This is problematic if one thinks that all counter-18
possibles are trivially true.  However, there are reasonable theories on which counter-possibles can be true or false.  I 
will help myself to them without argument.  I thank Brian Leftow for pointing this out to me. 
 Not by some external constraint, but by God’s own choice to do this rather than that.  God doesn’t chose to create 19
everything that God’s power allows God to create.
 One might worry that to say that God has unlimited love, especially for any finite particular, is problematic.  20
Michael Rea argues in his recent book, The Hiddenness of God (2018) that humans are not the proper object of 
“ideal love” from God, because this would entail that God has unlimited desire for our good and for union with us 
(75ff.), and one might doubt that we are the proper objects of such unlimited desires. I have addressed this issue to 
some degree in my review of the book (forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy) suggesting that “ideal love” should be 
understood to mean something like “virtuous love.” It may be that the divine nature itself (or the three persons of the 
trinity) are the only proper objects of the fully infinite divine love, but I see no problem claiming that God within the 
divine nature has no limits on the amount of love or capacity to love.  Any limits those that are presented by the 
object of love. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point. 
 I thank Chris Menzel for pressing me to clarify this point.21
 The claim that God’s knowledge of creation is logically prior to the creation is not completely uncontroversial.  22
Ross, at least, denies that this is the case, on the grounds that it weakens the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
 I thank the audiences of the Queen St. Colloquium and the Junior Metaphysicians Workshop for pressing the view 23
that propositional and non-propositional knowledge are fundamentally different categories such that it is 
conceptually impossible to know the content of one mode via the other.
 I owe a special debt of gratitude to Christopher Tollefsen for invaluable comments on multiple drafts of this paper.  24
I would also like to thank Craig Bacon, Michael Dickson, Lorraine Keller, George Kushf, Chris Menzel, Adam 
Omelianchuk, Michael Rea, Christina Van Dyke, and the audiences of the Classical Theism Workshop (2015), The 
Queen St. Symposium (2016), The Junior Metaphysicians Workshop (2016), and the Center for Philosophy of 
Religion at Notre Dame (2016) for helpful comments. 
